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Resumo: 
Este artigo pretende mostrar, inicialmente, como Hart compreende o direito enquanto 
um sistema normativo moderado, uma vez que o autor pauta seus argumentos sobre a 
função da linguagem para legitimar o conceito de textura aberta. Defensor do 
positivismo jurídico, Hart não pretende dizer que os sistemas jurídicos contemporâneos 
excluem os princípios e valores morais de sua estrutura, mas que o fundamento e a 
validade das normas encontram-se na hierarquia das fontes do direito (regras primárias e 
regras de reconhecimento). Por fim, mostramos de que modo o positivismo jurídico de 
Hart permanece herdeiro da tradição pragmática de linguagem sustentada por 
Wittgenstein. 
Palavras-chave: Linguagem; Positivismo Jurídico; Textura Aberta; Regra de 
Reconhecimento; Hart 
Abstract: 
The present article primarily aimed at showing how Hart understands the law as a 
moderate regulatory system as the author bases his argument on the role of language to 
legitimize the concept of open texture. Proponent of the legal positivism, Hart does not 
claim that the contemporary legal systems exclude moral values and principles of its 
structure, but that the basis and validity of the rules are in the hierarchy of law sources 
(primary rules and recognition rules). Finally, we show how the legal positivism of Hart 
remains as an heir to the pragmatic tradition of language supported by Wittgenstein. 
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Introduction 
The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct 
where much must be left to be developed by courts or officials striking 
a balance, in the light of circumstances, between competing interests 
which vary in weight from case to case.  
 
Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law. 
 
The Theory of Law by Herbert Hart is part of the proposal endorsed by the legal 
positivism, as his work The Concept of Law, published in 1961, represents a major 
milestone in retaking the methodological question of Law. From the deadlocks 
corresponding to the classical positivist theories, such as the theories by Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin, Hart focuses on pointing out their limitations, as these 
authors consider that certain foundations of any legal system consist, as he affirms, in 
the situation in which the majority of a social group usually obey the orders based on 
threats by an individual or sovereign persons, who, in turn, do not obey anyone.  
The corpus of the legal positivism, or juspositivism, consists in defining the 
legal phenomenon based on the exclusivity of the legal rules, which are established only 
by those who have the competence granted by the political power. Thus the legal system 
has a formal nature, primarily meaning that the law does not work through external 
criteria such as moral or politics, and that the legal positivism opts for the neutrality of 
the interpreter, excluding decisions that may be supported by the will of the lawmaker 
or the linguistic gaps of the rules. 
This question undoubtedly perceives the law as an operational activity in which 
the foundation and validity of the rules and the legal system lie in the higher hierarchy 
of the law sources. This means that the legal positivism aims at removing morality from 
the decisions, as the logical deduction is responsible for establishing the product of the 
will of a legislative authority. Unlike jusnaturalism, which supports the existence of a 
natural law parallel to what the State should create, the positivism is based only on the 
validity of the rules, which represent a monopoly of the legislative activity. 
P E R I  •  v .  1 0  •  n .  0 1  •  2 0 1 8  •  p .  1 5 1 - 1 6 4                                                1 5 3  
Together with Kelsen and his Pure Theory of Law, Herbert Hart, who considers 
the indetermination of Law as a product of the limitation of language that, in some 
cases, comes from the will of the creator or interpreter of the legal text, is also among 
the precursors of the legal positivism in the twentieth century. His less conservative 
view in comparison with Kelsen allows his theory to be entitled “moderate positivism”, 
as the legal system may accept the existence of morality to support court decisions. In 
this sense, the analysis of the language used by the law has become a major challenge to 
the legal hermeneutics and the definition of the normative criteria to the lawmaker (see 
BOBBIO, 1995, p. 18-36). However, the understanding of this peculiar type of 
positivism in the thoughts of Hart is only possible when we admit the concern arising 
from the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In this sense this paper aims at recovering the 
elements of the approach between the discussion on the language conducted by 
Wittgenstein and the theory of moderate positivism proposed by Herbert Hart in his 
work The Concept of Law. 
 This form of discussion means accepting that what makes the law unique is the 
legal rule, a command imposed to a given community that, once disobeyed, allows the 
State to use the positive legitimacy of its power to obligate those who do not follow it to 
adapt their behavior. This means that a penalty resulting from the interpretation of the 
rule may be applied in case of noncompliance. Therefore it is important to know, from a 
legal text, how the same meaning of the rule shall be achieved, that is, what is sought 
through the deduction of the result based on the analysis of its linguistic structure. For 
this reason it is possible to understand that the legal positivism collides with linguistics 
pathologies, disorders established at the moment of the interpretation of the meaning of 
the rules. Hart shows to have awakened from his "dogmatic sleep" by attributing to the 
Wittgensteinian rules the role of recognizing and enforcing the necessary legality to the 
legal system. 
In short, the foundation of the concept of law by Hart lies in the ultimate rule of 
recognition, which is linked to the social fact of its acceptance and presents a definition 
that is not exempt from a certain normative conception of law (of what the law should 
be) and, more precisely, of a moral and political conception of law. As a consequence, 
there is the problem of the ultimate foundation of the legal system, which, according to 
Hart, lies in the ultimate rule of recognition, from which all other rules are recognized 
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and admitted. In turn, this would be an unquestionably valid, not enunciated rule. It 
concerns a social fact attested upon the observation of the behavior of the social agents, 
thus generating their acceptance. At the same time it is important to emphasize that the 
“rule of recognition” is a legal rule and belongs to a legal system, presenting the dual 
function of providing a basis for the legal system and ensuring a standard that allows the 
identification of whether or not a rule belongs to that same system. 
Critique by Hart to the imperative theory of John Austin 
One of the primary ideas of the legal positivism by Hart is that the law does not 
consist exclusively of orders and commands. The clearest attempt to analyze the 
concept of law in terms of commands and habits was conducted by Austin in his works 
Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) and Lectures on Jurisprudence or the 
Philosophy Positive Law (1863). The philosophy of Austin, directly influenced by the 
works of Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Brentham, proposes that the legal system is 
formed only by general, imperative, threat-based rules. “The main aspect of the theory 
of law by Austin consists in understanding that the concept of law does not involve the 
concept of justice.” (KIRALY, 2008, p. 25). 
According to Austin, the ideas of command and obedience are often mistaken 
for the idea that an “order” by an authority is based on some threat. However when 
considering the function of the law and, consequently, the assumptions that constitute 
its legality, the statement by Austin is somewhat insufficient. This is one of the initial 
aspects of the critique by Hart, in which the law is not only a command or order 
established by means of threats imposed by the legal system; instead, to command is to 
“characteristically exercise authority over individuals, not the power to inflict them any 
harms, and although it may be associated to threats of penalties, a command is primarily 
an appeal to the respect for the authority rather than to fear” (HART, 1994, p. 19). 
Austin aims at finding the "province" of law determined, that is, the very own 
object of the jurisprudence. To do so he reflects based on a distinction between private 
jurisprudence and general jurisprudence. The first refers to the investigation on the 
operation of the positive laws, in force or not, in a given country. The latter promotes 
the investigation of the principles, notions and distinctions regarding the law, making 
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use of abstract reasoning and the operation of more complex legal systems. Thus 
primarily based on the analysis of the meaning of the word “law”, Austin aims at 
showing what a law is, rather than showing the law in a specific location (AUSTIN, 
1995, p. 14; AUSTIN, 1985). 
The word “law” has two applications: one is used in the proper meaning and the 
other in the improper meaning. Regarding the first, Austin identifies the divine laws and 
the positive laws, presenting general and abstract characteristics. Those with improper 
meaning include all situations that, instead of following a law, we just observe a partial 
determination, that is, situations in which people do not dominate the criteria for law 
determination. Therefore the thesis by Austin claims that the laws in the proper meaning 
are applied by a political authority to its subjects as a result of a desire of inflicting harm 
to those who disobey it (see AUSTIN, 1995, p. 22-28). Thus it is possible to understand 
that the command may only come from an authority that has all the sovereign powers.
 Austin also approached the character of obedience, a result of the conflict 
between the will of the legal act and the authority grounded on the superiority of the 
State based on its political position. Therefore Austin affirms that the law works only 
where a hierarchical relationship exists, that is, where some individuals command and 
others are commanded. In this case, the State shall only be sovereign if a separation 
between those who may elaborate commands and those who must obey them is 
established. This question establishes an irreconcilable separation between the 
jusnaturalism – with its view of natural rights – and the juspositivism.      
 
As an example, Austin mentions the supremacy of God in relation to men to the extent that 
His power influences believers to behave in accordance with His will. Something similar 
occurs with the subjects in relation to their sovereign, or with a magistrate in relation to the 
citizens. Therefore, the concepts of "superiority", "sanction", and "duty" are immediate 
results of the notion of command (KIRALY, 2008, p.50). 
 
As shown, in the philosophy of law of Austin the private will of the subject is in 
a lower hierarchical position in comparison to the will of the sovereign. For this reason 
the sovereignty depends on the superiority of the sovereign in relation to the others, and 
shall be exercised through certain attributes granted to the State, and never to particular 
individuals. According to Hart this conception arises from the false idea of a full 
“supremacy” of the sovereign, where the existence of the duty of “legislating” and 
imposing rights is observed, as in this perspective “making laws differs from ordering 
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people to do things, and we must allow for this difference in using this simple idea as a 
model for law”. " (HART, 1994, p. 22). About the law as coercive orders, Hart affirms 
that: 
 
The concept of general orders backed by threats given by one generally obeyed, which we 
have constructed by successive additions to the simple situation of the gunman case, plainly 
approximates closer to a penal statute enacted by the legislature of a modern state than to 
any other variety of law. For there are types of law which seem prima facie very unlike 
such penal statutes, and we shall have later to consider the claim that these other varieties of 
law also, in spite of appearances to the contrary, are really just complicated or disguised 
versions of this same form. But if we are to reproduce the features of even a penal statute in 
our constructed model of general orders generally obeyed, something more must be said 
about the person who gives the orders (HART, 1994, p. 24). 
 
As pointed out, Austin places the law based on coercive orders, in which the 
figure of the sovereign and the courts are above the subjects and can, if necessary, 
expand or reduce their level of freedom. By avoiding these hypotheses, Hart proposes a 
society that has a Rex in the power. This would be a democratic society in which its 
sovereign imposes the obligations to be followed in a coercive way. In the beginning of 
his reign there are complications arising from the wish of disobedience and fear of 
sanctions, which are legitimated according to the will of the sovereign. Over time this 
society begins to abide by his laws; a work that was initially uncommon becomes a 
standard behavior by means of habit formation (see HART, 1994, p.40). 
Hart concludes that in this case the sovereign may legitimate a habit that is 
widely observed by the subjects, making it a constitutional law as it is in accordance 
with other legitimized values. Continuing the exemplification, it is possible to consider, 
as pointed out by Hart, that Rex I has died and his son, Rex II, assumed the power. At 
first, the orders and commands imposed by the former lawmaker had been imposed by 
force of habit and were respected by that society. However the death of Rex I authorized 
his successor to legislate, but could not assure in any way that the society would obey 
him, taking into consideration that his government is not constituted with rules 
specifying such obedience. This shows that, a priori, Rex II did not actually “inherited” 
what his father had worked with the society, therefore Rex II would be a lawmaker with 
his succession threatened by the instability created over the structure of the legal 
system. According to Hart, “The mere fact that there was a general habit of obedience to 
Rex I in his lifetime does not by itself even render probable that Rex II will be 
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habitually obeyed (...). There is nothing to make him sovereign from the start” (HART, 
1994, p. 53). 
 In the positivist theory of Hart this example aims at showing two enigmas that 
permeate the construction of legal systems. The first presents a sociological character, in 
which the organization of a society by means of a legal system cannot be constituted 
only in a coercive way, as described by Austin. The second presents a methodological 
character, in which the legitimacy of a legal system must be in alignment with rules 
ensuring the efficiency of the laws that form the State and clearly establishing who is 
authorized to legislate on behalf of that society. 
Therefore, when initially dealing with the elements that differ the positivism of 
Austin from the positivism of Hart, it is possible to notice that the filling of the legal 
gaps is only possible when the existence of rules assuring the legitimacy of certain 
procedures used by the courts is recognized. Therefore the timelessness of the rules is 
disproportional in relation to the temporality of societies, as those values change 
quickly while the law is not allowed to change. The moderate positivism of Hart 
presents evidence of this problem and considers morality as a very important factor for 
the resolution of complex cases seemingly not reached by the limits of legality. 
Therefore the imperative character of the laws may only be seen through the analysis of 
the rules of the legal system, reducing the errors committed by excessive legality, as 
pointed out by Hart: "In 1944 a woman was prosecuted in England and convicted for 
telling fortunes in violation of the Witchcraft Act, I 735" (HART, 1994, p. 61).    
 At this point it is possible to show the first substantial conceptual contribution 
by Hart, that is, the distinction established by him between internal point of view and 
external point of view. The first “corresponds to the point of view of the agent that 
conforms to the model of behavior established by a rule and accepts it as it is”; in turn, 
the external point of view consists in that “of an external viewer that registers the 
generalized social practices, that is, the behavioral regularities.” 
 Regarding the individuals inserted within the external point of view, namely the 
lawmakers, it is essential to recognize that the behavioral rules are not established based 
on a threat of sanction, given that the conception of Law as a threat-based order is 
implausible. The philosopher states that in any legal system there are rules that do not 
consist in commands associated to sanctions that “do not impose duties and obligations” 
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(HART, 2005, p. 35), but rather rules that provide their recipients with powers to 
perform acts in accordance with the Law, including public powers to judge or legislate 
and private powers to establish or change legal relations. 
From primary and secondary rules to the open texture of law 
By affirming that the notion of coercive orders grounded on the habit of obeying 
cannot be understood as the key to jurisprudence, Hart points out that the law should be 
defined as the union of primary and secondary rules (see HART, 1994, p. 79 and segs.). 
In addition, Hart seeks to identify the internal mechanisms of the legal practice, which 
means that the great pathologies of jurisprudence lie both on the legality of the rules and 
on the problem of their interpretation. To Hart,  
 
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary type, 
human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or 
not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to the first; for they 
provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the 
primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence 
or control their operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type 
confer powers, public or private. Rules of the first type concern actions involving physical 
movement or changes; rules of the second type provide for operations which lead not 
merely to physical movement or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or 
obligations. (HART, 1994, p. 81).  
 
Differing from the moral rules that rule other types of behaviors, the primary 
rules establish certain legal obligations. In turn, the secondary rules are the effectiveness 
of the primary rules; they may create and change obligations. Thus the existing gap of 
guarantees of enforceability between the social and legal rules would be fought through 
the combination of primary and secondary rules. This would allow the definition of 
boundaries between law and moral, as the legal obligation is previously defined, while 
the moral obligations are subject to a social or private will. For this reason, “it is evident 
that only a small community closely linked by bonds of kinship, feelings and 
convictions in common, located at a stable environment, would be able to live under a 
regime of unofficial rules” (Cf. HART, 1994, p. 119). 
 In this sense it is only possible to think about primitive communities living 
without a legislative power, courts, or any type of authorities. Complex communities 
willing to have a social control in an arbitrary way are grounded on procedures that 
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recognize some text or individual that is authorized to deliberate under general rules. 
Therefore the essence of positivism is enunciated with the strict possibility that only the 
text (for example, a Constitution) or authorized individuals (courts and lawmakers) keep 
the legitimacy to create, change, and eliminate rules of the legal system. 
By refusing the formalism, whose core idea is that the world may be adapted to a 
mechanical jurisprudence and that it is possible to freeze the meaning of the rule so that 
its general terms present the same meaning in all cases in which its application is 
discussed, and the skepticism, that is, the fact that the courts make decisions based on 
the inexistence of a standard meaning to the rules, Hart presents one of the passages that 
approximates his work to the philosophy of language of  Wittgenstein:  
 
The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be 
left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, 
between competing interests which vary in weight from case to case. None the less, the life 
of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of officials and private 
individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of variable standards, do not 
require from them a fresh judgment from case to case. This salient fact of social life 
remains true, even though uncertainties may break out as to the applicability of any rule 
(whether written or communicated by precedent) to a concrete case. (HART, 1994, p. 135). 
 
 With the introduction of the concept of “open texture” Hart defends a type of 
inclusive positivism, that is, that the law is formed by areas of hard decisions, where not 
even the rules can guide the actual meaning of the legal rule. Therefore the legal 
hermeneutics would be the expected hypothesis to establish the best meaning to a rule, 
as it is not possible to discuss an actual meaning to the interpretation.  
 The term “open texture” was initially used by Friedrich Waismann, who 
maintained a solid contact with Wittgenstein between 1927 and 1936. Waismann used 
the notion of “porosität der Begriffe” (open texture), approaching the notion of "family 
resemblance" Wittgenstein (BIX, 1991; GLOCK, 1998, p. 127). Hart uses this concept 
to build a model of the positivist theory of law with a more moderate characteristic, 
without necessarily requiring an abandonment of his positivism of rules and notion of 
legitimacy. In this sense the indetermination presented by the words aggravate the fact 
that we gave some credit to the predictability of the legal decisions. Therefore the major 
problem of the law is essentially of linguistic nature.   
Thus, Hart argues that the law consists of normative propositions related to the 
jurisprudence or the law that should, in the act of their enforcement, adapt to other type 
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of propositions, namely the descriptive propositions of facts – in the case of the law, 
socially built facts. The actual meaning of law (what the law is) is established within the 
scope of the articulation between these two types of propositions in the routine of the 
legal environment, namely in their use. For this reason, according to Hart, the previous 
legal theory was dominated by a false conception of language, as it sought that essence 
or pure entity to which the word law should refer. In this sense Hart uses elements 
derived from the pragmatic conception of language built by Wittgenstein. 
As pointed out, when describing the law based on primitive communities in 
which social pressure is the only type of control, Hart lists failures in the constitution of 
these regimes, as non-official rules lead to conflicts in the internal relationship. These 
failures include uncertainty, the static character of rules, and the ineffectiveness of 
social pressure. On the other hand, the resolution of this pre-legal moment may occur, 
considering that 
 
The remedy for each of these three main defects [unsureness, static and inefficacy, grifo 
nosso] in this simplest form of social structure consists in supplementing the primary rules 
of obligation with secondary rules which are rules of a different kind. The introduction of 
the remedy for each defect might, in itself, be considered a step from the prelegal into the 
legal world; since each remedy brings with it many elements that permeate law: certainly 
all three remedies together are enough to convert the regime of primary rules into what is 
indisputably a legal system. (HART, 1994, p. 94). 
 
The solution pointed out by Hart to these three failures consists in the 
complementation of the primary rules of obligation with the secondary rules. Initially, 
the solution for the uncertainty of the primary rules is the introduction of recognition 
rules. This rule specifies the characteristics considered as a conclusive indication that it 
is a rule of the group and that it should be supported due to its social pressure. 
To the second case, the solution for the static character of the primary rules 
regime consists in the introduction of modification rules, as these rules confer power to 
an individual or group of individuals to introduce new primary rules to the behavioral 
life of a group or to eliminate former rules. And finally, in order to fix the failures 
related to the ineffectiveness of the diffuse social pressure, and also to become aware of 
whether or not a rule was violated, Hart named this group judgement rules, which are 
responsible for appointing the individuals that shall perform the trials and the 
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procedures that must be followed (see HART, 1994, p.110 and segs; HART, 1958, p. 
593). 
This arrangement is possible because the recognition rules point out which 
criteria must be identified with legitimate legal rules. Thus, the recognition rule allows 
the establishment of a legal validation, as although they are not explicitly declared, their 
existence is shown through the way specific rules are identified “by the courts or 
authorities, by private individuals or their lawyers and legal advisors and, in addition, 
they must be effectively accepted as official public standards of behavior by the 
authorities of the system” (HART, 1994, p. 150). 
The debt of the legal positivism of Hart to the thought of Wittgenstein 
The close relationship of Hart with the late thoughts of Wittgenstein, particularly 
in the Philosophical Investigations, has made the legal positivism less strict in its 
methodology. This is easily identified in one of the notes in The Concept of Law, in 
which Hart presents observations related to the first chapter: 
 
Understanding of the different ways in which the several instances of a general term may be 
related i s o f particular importance in the case of legal, moral, and political terms. (…) For 
the notion of 'family resemblance': see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, i, paras. 
66-76. C£ Chapter VIII, s. I on the structure of the term 'just'. Wittgenstein's advice (op. 
cit., para. 66) is peculiarly relevant to the analysis of legal and political terms. Considering 
the definition of 'game' he said, 'Don't say there must be something common or they would 
not be called 'games ', but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you 
look at them you will not see anything common to all but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series at that.' (HART, 1994, p. 279-280). 
 
 In this sense Hart understands the law as a social practice, as the validation 
criteria consists in a social behavior established by the normativity of the rules. The 
establishment of a species of taxonomy of the different types of rules and their 
meanings is not possible in the “legal language games”. They work through family 
resemblances, without super concepts that can easily support the deduction of their 
interpretation and, consequently, work in a denotative manner. Due to the impossibility 
of clearly defining the boundaries if their interpretation, the legal concepts must be seen 
as a blur. In Wittgenstein's words: 
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The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then 
when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore 
as it were entangled in our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to 
understand (i.e. get a clear view of).  
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out 
otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a 
contradiction appears: "I didn't mean it like that." (WITTGENSTEIN, 1996, §125). 
 
 As in the previous example, Wittgenstein describes the activity of following a 
rule as a social practice, mentioning “behaviors”, “habits”, and “institutions” (see 
PERUZZO JÚNIOR, 2018). This is suggested by the affirmation that “one cannot 
follow a rule privately” (WITTGENSTEIN, 1996, § 202; see STERN, 2005). The rules 
are pointed out as correction standards, that is, they do not describe what people say, but 
define what is to speak correctly and meaningfully inside a given context. Thus the use 
is the criterion for the meaning of legal language, which is only presented as significant 
because there is the understanding of the mechanisms that permeate the words within 
their respective language games. For example, regardless of being moral, political, or 
religious, a rule cannot be seen in isolation from the context in which it appears. 
Thus the introduction of the Wittgensteinian thought that the language is an 
activity guided by rules and therefore its meaning is not something normative in all the 
contexts is seen by Hart as a new look over the validity and operation of the rules and 
concepts that structure the legal universe. In this case there is a particular type of legal 
positivism that differs from the legal positivism of Kelsen. If the rules can be evaluated 
based on their contexts, then it is possible that their normativity establishes the criterion 
for interpretation related to each specific case (see URUEÑA-SÁNCHEZ, 2017, p. 193-
219). 
Beyond the objections between law and moral, Hart is heir to the observations of 
the philosophy of language of Wittgenstein. The classical discussion between positivists 
and non-positivists in relation to the gaps of law, that is, where hard cases demand 
solutions that are beyond the rules or which would be the best criteria to be used to 
solve the generality of the social behavior, presents arguments that admit the possibility 
of an "open texture" in the legal system. Therefore it is not possible to recognize only 
one source of authority in complex legal systems, but many of them, considering that in 
addition to the legislative power, which holds the monopoly of laws, it is possible to 
recognize the customary laws and the legal decisions of the courts, since they are 
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established in the rules of recognition (see VALVERDE, 2007, p. 25-53; RODRIGUES 
and HEINEN, 2016, p. 193-215). 
Final considerations 
The observations presented about the legal positivism of Hart and the philosophy 
of language of Wittgenstein point out two positions found in the modern law: (i) the 
crisis in the legitimation process of the rules of recognition of the legal systems and, (ii) 
the equivocality of terms used to meet the normative conditions of the laws. 
These points are meaningful as they are critical to the semantic structure of the 
grammar of the terms used in the legal speech in the courts and the current use of the 
legal language. The legal language presents the pathologies of its own internal structure 
– the interpretation and vagueness of the rules. Thus, leaving aside the positivist 
scientific ideal, Hart shares some Wittgensteinian presuppositions, and although he 
understands the law through basic structures, he affirms that it is necessary to consider 
the open texture of law as an unavoidable mechanism, especially for the hard cases. 
Abstractly constructed legal concepts, including the law, are therefore 
questioned by Hart based on the conception of the meaning as use. In this sense, 
according to Hart, discussing the law from the general, descriptive point of view, 
focusing on what the law is and not on what it should be, relates to the investigation of 
practices seeking general truths, although these may be fallible. Nevertheless, it is 
important to observe that the jusphilosopher does not reject the need of a minimum 
content of the natural law as a “modest object”. Survival is a real element that, in the 
legal field, requires the investigation of the nature in the establishment of the law. Thus 
these questions, associated to a series of others, make Hart the embryo of the linguistic-
hermeneutic turn that the contemporary critics very slowly start to observe within the 
very legal positivism. 
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